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Are Green Payments Good
for the Environment?
Erik Lichtenberg
There is growing interest in green payments subsidizing conservation measures on working farmland
based on the premise that they have positive effects on the environment and agriculture simultaneously
without causing international trade distortions. This paper uses a Ricardian land market equilibrium
model to examine the impacts of green payments. The analysis shows green payments can worsen
ambient pollution damage by subsidizing the expansion of more intensive crop cultivation. Some
forms of green can increase cultivation intensity (and thus environmental damage) as well. These
adverse effects can be avoided by careful targeting, but such targeting is likely to be quite difficult.
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One of the notable features of the 2002 farm bill is
a new emphasis on promoting conservation on
working farmland. In contrast to previous legisla-
tion, whose conservation provisions emphasized
land retirement, the current farm bill authorizes a
sixfold increase in cost sharing for conservation
practices under the Environmental Quality Incen-
tives Program (EQIP) and other programs. It also
includes authorization of a new program, the Con-
servation Security Program (CSP), under which
farmers are offered both annual rental payments
and cost sharing for implementing various kinds of
conservation projects on working farmland.
This new emphasis on green payments that sub-
sidize conservation on working farmland seems to
be driven by political currents likely to endure. One
impetus toward green payments comes from politi-
cal pressure exerted by environmental advocacy
groups. Environmentalists have argued that farm
income supports linked to current output create
incentives for farmers to overuse pesticides and
fertilizers, with resulting adverse effects on environ-
mental quality. Environmentalists have therefore
pushed for the expansion of conservation subsidies
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as a politically attractive means of addressing non-
point source pollution emanating from agriculture.
Further impetus for this shift in farm programs
comes from World Trade Organization (WTO)
restrictions on output-distorting income supports.
Green payments are widely held not to alter incen-
tives governing farmers’ yield objectives (and thus
input use) as understood under WTO rules, render-
ing them exempt from WTO limits on farm subsidy
payments.
The attraction of green payments stems from a
belief that they have positive effects on the environ-
ment and agriculture simultaneously—and that they
accomplish these effects in ways which don’t dis-
tort international trade. But is this premise correct?
In this paper, a Ricardian land market equilibrium
model is used to examine this question theoreti-
cally. The analysis raises some questions about the
procedures used to allocate green payments and the
wisdom of using green payment programs to achieve
environmental objectives.
The Model
A Ricardian model is used that characterizes land
market equilibrium under risk neutrality where
diversification among crops and farming practices
is due to heterogeneous land quality. This model
was introduced by Caswell and Zilberman (1986) to
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model irrigation technology adoption. Lichtenberg
(1989) developed a more general formulation of the
model and applied it empirically. Malik and Shoe-
maker (1993) used it to examine optimal targeting
of cost sharing in cases where cost sharing is neces-
sary to make adoption of conservation practices
economically attractive. Lichtenberg (2002) used
the model to discuss the implications of heterogen-
eity for environmental policies aimed at agriculture.
These papers all apply a formulation in which pol-
lution arises from the use of a specific input. Here,
a more general formulation is adopted based on the
output-oriented model of agriculture and the envi-
ronment presented by Lichtenberg (2002).
Consider a farming region of size N that is small
relative to the total agricultural economy. Assume
the landscape can be divided into plots of equal size,
each of which is of quality θ 0 [0,1]. Let G(θ) be
the amount of land of quality no greater than θ (i.e.,
the cumulative distribution of land quality θ), and
g(θ) be the amount of land of quality exactly θ (i.e.,
the density of land quality θ). Assume the land has
two uses, intensive crop production and a residual
use like pasture or hay production. To simplify the
analysis (but with no loss of generality), assume
residual use has a negligible impact on environ-
mental quality and the rent generated by this
residual use, π, is invariant with respect to land
quality.
Intensive crop production produces two outputs,
an agricultural commodity y and environmental
damage q. These outputs can be produced using
either of two technologies, each of which can be
characterized by a standard quasi-convex cost
function C
j(yj, qj, θ), j = 1, 2. The marginal cost of
the agricultural commodity is positive and increas-
ing in output y (letting subscripts denote derivatives,
Cy
j, Cyy
j  > 0). Environmental damage is valuable to
the farmer because it lowers the cost of producing
the agricultural commodity. Assume that it lowers
both the total cost of production and the marginal




j  $ 0 as well. Without loss of
generality, assume land quality is measured in such
a way that the cost of production under either tech-
nology is lower when land quality is higher, i.e.,
Cθ
j < 0. Diminishing marginal productivity of land
quality implies Cθθ
j > 0. The rent generated by inten-
sive crop production using technology j on a parcel
of land of quality θ is thus pyj ! C
j(yj, qj, θ).
Assume each farmer’s contribution to ambient
pollution, M, is proportional to the level of on-farm
environmental damage chosen, q:
(1)   M '
m j δj(θ)m j(θ)qj(θ) g(θ) dθ,
where m
j(θ) is the share of on-farm environmental
damage from using technology j on land of quality
θ that is added to ambient pollution, and δj(θ) is the
share of land of quality θ allocated to technology j.
(Note that this formulation allows for differential
effects of farming on ambient pollution due to dif-
ferences in technology and land quality.) Finally,
let social damage from ambient pollution be a con-
vex function of ambient pollution, D(M).
Following the exposition in Lichtenberg (2002),
this analysis focuses on the case where the resource-
conserving farming system (a) causes less environ-
mental damage, and (b) has a comparative advantage
on lower quality land, i.e., its productivity is less
sensitive to land quality. This characterization makes
intuitive sense when topography is the critical
element of land quality. Land with steep slopes is
more costly to cultivate than flatter land. It is also
more prone to erosion and runoff problems. Imple-
menting erosion-control measures like plowing on
the contour, stripcropping, or lining natural channels
in the field with rocks or grass protects against
erosion which would lower productivity (or increase
cost) and reduces sediment and nutrient runoff at
the same time. These measures also provide more
protection on more steeply sloped land than on
flatter land.
This characterization also fits many situations in
which improved application efficiency promises
to enhance both environmental and productive
performance. For example, improving nutrient man-
agement through split fertilizer application or chemi-
gation via low-volume irrigation systems essentially
involves substituting conservation technologies as
a means of obtaining the nutrient- and water-delivery
services that the soil would otherwise provide. These
technologies tend to have a comparative advantage
on lower quality land, and because they feature
increased application efficiency, they reduce envi-
ronmental damage at the same time.
These characteristics can be formalized as follows.
Assume that environmental damage under technol-
ogy 1 (the less polluting technology) reduces both
total cost and the marginal cost of the agricultural
commodity less than environmental damage under










(Recall that these derivatives are all negative, so
this assumption means the absolute value of Cq and140   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Cyq is less under technology 1 than under technol-
ogy 2.) Also, assume m
1(θ) < m
2(θ), i.e., a given
level of on-farm environmental damage causes less
ambient pollution under technology 1 than under
technology 2. Further assume m
j





Profit-maximizing input use and the land market
equilibrium allocation of land between the two pro-
duction technologies is found by choosing the level
of output of the agricultural commodity under each
technology on each quality of land [y1(θ), y2(θ)],
environmental degradation under each technology
on each quality of land [q1(θ), q2(θ)], and the share
of land allocated to each technology on each quality





δ1(θ) py1& C 1(y1, q1, θ)
% δ2(θ) py2& C 2(y2, q2, θ)
% 1 & δ1(θ) & δ2(θ) π g(θ) dθ.
This is a non-autonomous control problem over land
quality θ. Both output of the agricultural commodity
and environmental degradation will vary with land
quality.
Land market equilibrium is analyzed under the
following regularity assumptions, which correspond
to the standard single-crossing condition generally
used in models of this kind: (a) There exists a
farm type such that = 0, θ
o









j = 1, 2, where the superscript “o” denotes profit-
maximizing choices in the absence of environ-





lated regime the lowest quality of land on which the
intensive crop is grown will utilize technology 1;





sensitive to land quality than technology 2; and
(d)) ,  w h e r e py
o











technology 2 is more profitable than technology 1
on the highest quality of land. In contrast to Malik
and Shoemaker (1993) (but in accord with empirical
evidence about adoption of conservation practices),
it is assumed some farmers find it profitable to adopt
technology 1 even in the absence of cost sharing. The
results obtained here can be easily extended to the
case considered by Malik and Shoemaker (1993)
where cost sharing is necessary to make adoption of
technology 1 profitable for any farmer.
In the absence of environmental regulation, out-
put of the agricultural commodity and environ-
mental degradation under each technology will be
determined by the conditions:














j (θ), θ ' 0, j ' 1, 2 œ θ.
The control problem is linear in the shares of land
allocated to each technology on each quality of land;
as a result, each share is either at its lower (zero) or
upper bound (one) on each quality of land.
Under the regularity conditions assumed above,
each activity (the residual use, technology 1, tech-
nology 2) will be used on a compact subset of the
possible values of land quality. The lowest quality
of land on which the intensive crop is grown will


















There will also be a unique critical switching quality
of land defined by θ
o
c,






























The equilibrium allocation of land will be such that
all land of quality lower than will be allocated to θ
o
1
the residual use; all land of quality will θ
o
1# θ < θ
o
c
produce the intensive crop using technology 1
(δ1 = 1, δ2 = 0); and all land of quality 1 θ
o
c # θ #
will produce the intensive crop using technology 2
(δ1 = 0, δ2 = 1).
This land market equilibrium can be depicted
graphically using the profit-maximizing rent curves









shown in figure 1. The rent curves for technologies
1 and 2 are concave in land quality because of
diminishing reductions in marginal cost from (equiv-
alently, diminishing marginal productivity of) land
quality. The rent curve for the residual use, π, is
horizontal because it is invariant with respect to
land quality. The regularity conditions imposed
here imply that the technology 1 rent curve cuts the
horizontal axis to the left of the horizontal intercept
of the technology 2 rent curve, and that the tech-
nology 2 rent curve is everywhere steeper than the
technology 1 rent curve. These conditions also
imply that the technology 2 rent curve is steep
enough to intersect the technology 1 rent curve
somewhere in the [0,1] interval. As figure 1
indicates, the residual use is the most profitable on
the lowest qualities of land; technology 1 is more
profitable than technology 2 on the lowest qualitiesLichtenberg Are Green Payments Good for the Environment?   141
1











                          θ1
o      θ1
*         θc
o     θc
*
Figure 1. Equilibrium land allocations in the social optimum and in the
absence of environmental regulation
of land used to produce the intensive crop (land of









Comparison to the Social Optimum
It is straightforward to show that the unregulated
land market equilibrium features too high a level of
intensive crop production on every quality of land,
too much environmental degradation on every qual-
ity of land, too much land producing the intensive
crop, and too much medium-quality land producing
the agricultural commodity under the more polluting
technology.
The social optimum is found by choosing the level
of output of the agricultural commodity under each
technology on each quality of land [y1(θ), y2(θ)],
environmental degradation under each technology
on each quality of land [q1(θ), q2(θ)], and the share
of land allocated to each technology on each quality
of land [δ1(θ), δ2(θ)] in order to maximize agri-
cultural rent less ambient pollution damage D(M)
subject to equation (2). The necessary conditions
for social welfare-maximizing output of the
intensive crop y and environmental degradation
q on any given quality of land under technology
j are:




(7)   &C
j
q & λm j ' 0,
where λ, the shadow price of ambient environ-
mental damage, equals DN(M), the marginal social
cost of environmental damage. These are standard.
Equation (6) states that intensive crop output should
be chosen to equate marginal production cost with
price. Equation (7) states that environmental damage
should be chosen to equate the reduction in produc-
tion cost with the marginal value of its contribution
to ambient pollution.
Diminishing marginal productivity implies both
yj and qj are decreasing in the shadow price of
ambient pollution damage λ. Since the unregulated
land market equilibrium is just the social optimum
with λ = 0, it follows that y and q are larger when
there is no regulation.
The condition defining the minimum quality of
















& λm1(θ() ' π,
which shows rent per unit of land area in intensive
crop production using technology 1 (including the142   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
marginal value of its contribution to ambient pollu-
tion) should equal rent to the residual use. Differen-











Greater marginal damage from ambient pollution λ
implies that less low-quality land should be allo-
cated to production of the intensive crop. Since the
unregulated land market equilibrium equals the
social welfare-maximizing land market equilibrium





low-quality land is allocated to the intensive crop.
The condition defining the critical switching

























which states that rent under both technologies pro-
ducing the intensive crop (including the marginal
value of the contribution of each to ambient pol-

















Greater marginal damage from ambient pollution λ
implies more medium-quality land should be allo-
cated to production of the intensive crop using the
resource-conserving technology (technology 1).
Because the unregulated land market equilibrium
equals the social welfare-maximizing land market





too much medium-quality land produces the inten-
sive crop using technology 2.
Figure 1 compares land allocations in the social
optimum and in the absence of environmental regu-
lation. The socially optimal rent curves for the inten-
sive crop under both technologies lie below and to
the right of the corresponding rent curves in the
absence of environmental regulation. The vertical
distance between the socially optimal and unregu-
lated rent curves equals the value of ambient
pollution damage attributable to intensive crop
production under each technology on each quality of
land. It is greater for the more polluting technology
(technology 2). The two socially optimal rent curves
for the intensive crop thus intersect to the right of the
intersection of the unregulated rent curves.
It follows that ambient pollution damage is higher
in absence of environmental regulation than in the













% m1(θc)q1(θc) & m2(θc)q2(θc) g(θc)∆θc,
where the ∆ terms represent deviations of the unreg-
ulated land market equilibrium levels from the
socially optimal ones. Equations (6) and (7) imply
that ∆q1 and ∆q2 > 0; environmental damage in the
unregulated land market equilibrium exceeds the
social optimum on all qualities of land. The fact
that Mθ1
*/Mλ > 0 implies ∆θ1 is negative (too much
low-quality land is allocated to intensive crop
production), while the fact that Mθc
*/Mλ > 0 implies
∆θc is negative (too much medium-quality land is
allocated to the more environmentally damaging
technology). It follows that ∆M > 0; i.e., ambient
pollution is greater in the unregulated equilibrium
than in the social optimum.
Impacts of Green Payments
This section evaluates the premise underlying the
attraction of green payments—that they mitigate am-
bient pollution damage by moving the land market
equilibrium closer to the social welfare-maximizing
equilibrium. There are two ways of implementing
green payments. One is to give farmers a fixed pay-
ment per acre either as a rental payment or as a flat
rate subsidy set according to the farming technology
adopted (rather than according to actual expenses).
The second is to set payments according to the actual
expenses the farmer incurs.
Conservation cost sharing under EQIP and other
programs is based on actual expenses incurred:
Farmers are reimbursed for a percentage of their
actual costs. The CSP pays a fixed rental rate in
addition to cost sharing. Rental rates are fixed legis-
latively and are invariant with respect to land quality,
although they do vary to some extent according to
the level of conservation effort the farmer contracts
to undertake. Because regulations for implementing
the CSP have not yet been finalized, it is unclearLichtenberg Are Green Payments Good for the Environment?   143
how cost sharing will be implemented under CSP.
However, the precedents set by other federal con-
servation cost-sharing programs suggest reimburse-
ments will be based on actual expenses incurred.
1
These payments can be incorporated into the
model as follows. Let T denote a fixed payment
like the CSP rental payment, and s denote the
share of actual cost reimbursed.
2 Then rent per
acre generated by technology 1 with a fixed green
payment can be written as T. py1&C 1(y1, q1,θ)%
Similarly, the rent generated by technology 1 on
land of quality θ when green payments are based on
reimbursement of actual costs incurred is given
by py1&(1&s)C 1(y1, q1, θ).
Clearly, the fixed payment T does not affect the
choice of agricultural commodity output y or envi-
ronmental damage q on the intensive margin, i.e.,
on land using technology 1 without a subsidy. But
it does affect the minimum quality of land in pro-
duction θ1 and the critical switching quality of land
θc [Malik and Shoemaker (1993) and Lichtenberg
(2002) derive the same result]. Differentiating
equation (4) defining θ1 using the envelope theorem
(after modifying rent under technology 1 to incor-











which implies a fixed per acre green payment
increases the amount of low-quality land allocated
to cultivation of the intensive crop. Differentiating
equation (5) defining θc using the envelope theorem
(again after modifying rent under technology 1 to













which implies a fixed per acre payment increases
the amount of medium-quality land allocated to the
conservation technology.
Graphically, the fixed payment T causes a parallel
upward shift in the technology 1 rent curve (see
figure 2). As a result, the minimum-quality land
using technology 1 decreases while the maximum-
quality land using technology 1 increases.























The first term in square brackets is positive—
switching land from the residual use to production
of the intensive crop increases environmental dam-
age, even under technology 1. The second term is
negative because producing the intensive crop under
technology 1 causes less environmental damage than
producing it under technology 2. Consequently, the
net effect of green payments on ambient pollution
damage is ambiguous. However, it is clearly pos-
sible that offering the fixed per acre green payment
T will actually worsen ambient pollution problems.
Such perverse outcomes are more likely to occur in
regions having a lot of marginal low-quality land





or where low-quality land use is quite sensitive
to the green payment is large), especially (Mθ
T
1/MT




Cost sharing based on actual expenses incurred
will affect the choice of agricultural commodity out-
put y and environmental damage q, as well as the
minimum quality of land producing the agricultural
commodity θ1 and the critical switching quality of
land θc. Differentiating equations (2) and (3), after
modifying them to incorporate reimbursement for
costs incurred while using technology 1, with



































Specifically, both y and q increase on all qualities
of land that would use technology 1 even in the
absence of green payments. Intuitively, cost sharing
has no direct effect on incentives for environmental
damage, but it does have an indirect effect—it makes
it profitable to produce more of the agricultural
1  Another important difference between EQIP and CSP is that EQIP
payments are made to farmers for installing new conservation measures,
while CSP payments are made for ongoing conservation measures. The
implications of the restriction on EQIP payments are discussed in greater
detail below.
2  A fixed payment T also corresponds to an income support subsidy
which is completely decoupled from current output such as the direct
payments and counter-cyclical payments provided in the current farm bill.
The results obtained here thus also apply to these decoupled subsidies.144   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
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Figure 2. Impact of a fixed per acre green payment on equilibrium land
allocations in the absence of environmental regulation
commodity, which creates an incentive for more
environmental degradation as a means of lowering
the marginal cost of the agricultural commodity. As
a result, green payments based on reimbursement of
actual expenses incurred worsens environmental
damage on all land on which technology 1 is the
most profitable in the absence of cost sharing.
As in the case of a fixed payment, cost sharing
based on actual expenses incurred will shift the tech-
nology 1 rent curve upward, whereby the minimum
quality of land using technology 1 will fall while the
maximum quality of land using technology 1 will
rise. Differentiating the equation defining θ1 using











where green payments based on reimbursement for
actual expenses incurred increase the amount of
low-quality land allocated to cultivation of the inten-
sive crop.
3
Differentiating the equation defining θc using the













showing that green payments based on reimburse-
ment for actual expenses incurred increase the
amount of medium-quality land allocated to the
conservation technology.
The impact of reimbursement for actual expenses





























The first term in square brackets is the intensive
margin effect of reimbursement for actual expenses
incurred, i.e., the increase in environmental degrad-
ation on all land that would use technology 1 in the
absence of green payments. It is positive. The second 3  Note that such a shift in land allocation might not occur under EQIP,
which cost-shares installation of new conservation measures on existing
working farmland. If the residual activity and intensive agriculture do not
produce similar outputs (e.g., pasture or grazing land versus cropland),
then land of quality less than θ2
o would not be eligible for EQIP payments
at all, and land of quality less than θc
o would not be eligible for EQIP
payments if the operator were already using technology 1. These limita-
tions would not occur under CSP or under generic proposals for green
payments often discussed in the literature.Lichtenberg Are Green Payments Good for the Environment?   145
term in square brackets is the lower extensive margin
effect of shifting land from the residual use to culti-
vation of the intensive crop under technology 1. It,
too, is positive.
4 The third term in square brackets
is the upper extensive margin effect of switching
technologies used to cultivate the intensive crop
from technology 2 to technology 1. It is negative,
and thus the net effect of this form of green
payment on environmental damage is ambiguous.
Again, however, it is possible that ambient pollution
damage will actually get worse. Such a perverse
outcome is more likely if the cost of producing the
agricultural commodity is quite sensitive to environ-
mental degradation (Cyq is large in absolute value);
the region has a lot of marginal low-quality land
and low-quality land use is quite sensitive to the
green payment; and/or the region has relatively little
medium-quality land and medium-quality land use
is not very sensitive to cost sharing.
Implications for Targeting
The preceding discussion assumed implicitly that
every farmer using technology 1 would automatic-
ally be awarded green payments. This is not neces-
sarily the case, however, even with the expanded
funding authorized by the farm bill. Budget con-
straints may lead to rationing of funds. As reported
by the Farm Services Agency of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA), requests exceed the
funds currently available by a ratio of 5:1. Those
constraints will be relaxed substantially in the
future if Congress appropriates the full funding
authorized by the 2002 farm bill, but constraints on
the overall federal budget may prevent it from
doing so. 
Nevertheless, even in the absence of budget
limitations, some farmers may be prevented from
receiving green payments by oversight exerted by
conservation technicians from the Natural Resources
Conservation Service (NRCS). At present, for ex-
ample, every cost-share proposal under EQIP must
meet the approval of an NRCS technician before it
can even be considered for funding. NRCS techni-
cians will not approve proposals which are incon-
sistent with an operation’s approved conservation
plan or with other general conservation goals. Also,
as noted earlier, EQIP payments are generally
restricted to projects involving installation of new
conservation measures on existing operations. Pro-
posals involving shifts from pasture or grazing land
to cropland or other major land use changes should
be ineligible for cost sharing under EQIP.
Thus, even though green payments might have
perverse effects on ambient environmental quality
in some circumstances, those effects can be avoided
by careful targeting. For example, as Malik and
Shoemaker (1993) have pointed out previously,
distortions on the lower extensive margin can be
avoided by making conservation projects resulting
in the expansion of more intensive crop cultivation
ineligible for green payments. In cases such as those
modeled here, this would mean enforcing conser-
vation compliance provisions disqualifying cost
sharing or CSP contracts for projects involving
crop production on land currently in low-intensity,
non-polluting uses like pasture or hay production.
5
Distortions on the intensive margin can be avoided
by decoupling cost-share reimbursements from actual
expenses, for example, by setting fixed repayment
amounts based on formulas. Cost sharing and CSP
contracts could be awarded preferentially to farmers
cultivating medium-quality land on which resource-
conserving and more intensive farming systems are
close to equally profitable, since these are the cir-
cumstances in which green payments for practices
like those considered here actually result in reduc-
tions in environmental damage.
Paradoxically, green payments are more likely to
have perverse effects on ambient environmental
quality when they are targeted toward land seem-
ingly most in need of conservation. For example,
land quality augmenting technologies such as those
modeled here have the greatest profitability
advantage on the lowest qualities of land used for
intensive crop cultivation. Weighting vulnerability
to erosion damage or other indicators of low land
quality heavily in making green payment awards
will favor provision of funding for projects most
likely to result in expansion of intensive crop
production. In contrast, green payments result in the
greatest improvements in ambient environmental
quality when they are targeted toward medium-
quality land used for intensive crop production; yet
4  The second term will be zero and the first term will be smaller under
EQIP if payments are made only for installation of new conservation
measures on existing operations, as noted above. Thus, perverse outcomes
are less likely under EQIP than under CSP or generic green payment
programs.
5  The USDA’s record in this regard is not encouraging. A recent study
by the U.S. General Accounting Office (2003) found that 60% of all
citations for conservation compliance violations issued by NRCS were
subsequently granted waivers by the Farm Services Agency, largely with
little or no justification. As I have argued elsewhere (Lichtenberg, 2004),
the USDA’s culture as an agency dedicated to representing and serving
the farm community is a major impediment to its ability to enforce regula-
tory provisions that are directly contrary to farmers’ interests.146   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
this land seems much less in need of conservation
from a purely physical or agronomic viewpoint than
low-quality land.
These considerations provide a possible explan-
ation for the results obtained by Bastos and
Lichtenberg (2001) in their empirical study of federal
conservation cost-sharing awards in Maryland.
They found federal cost-share funds were not
awarded preferentially to the most erodible land.
Quite the reverse was found: Land with the greatest
tolerance for soil loss (i.e., least vulnerability to
erosion) was significantly more likely to have
received cost sharing than land with the lowest soil
loss tolerance (greatest erosion vulnerability). More-
over, federal cost-share funds were awarded
preferentially to land with medium and high crop
production potential. While puzzling at first glance,
these results seem consistent with targeting cost
sharing toward land around the critical switching
quality θc (although Bastos and Lichtenberg do not
rule out other interpretations—for example, that cost
sharing targets enhancing crop productivity rather
than environmental quality).
The analysis of the preceding section also points
to another potential problem: Even when targeting
avoids cases where green payments worsen envi-
ronmental quality, it remains possible that they will
accomplish absolutely nothing in terms of improve-
ments in ambient environmental quality. Partici-
pation in these programs is voluntary. The farmers
most likely to want to enroll are those for whom
using resource-conserving technologies would be
the most profitable even in the absence of green
payments. Thus, voluntary green payment programs
can be subject to adverse selection effects in the
sense that payments may be made to farmers who
would have implemented resource conservation
measures even without receiving those payments.
In such cases, green payments amount to pure
income transfers resulting in no additional improve-
ments in ambient environmental quality.
A recent paper by Lichtenberg and Smith-
Ramirez (2003) examines this issue more closely.
Their empirical study of cost sharing and conserva-
tion effort exerted by Maryland farmers found that
farmers with operations having streams running
through them or bordering the Chesapeake Bay were
not more likely to have been awarded cost-share
funding, even though nutrient pollution in the Bay
and its tributaries is the predominant environmental
concern associated with agriculture in the state. For
farmers without bodies of water on their operations,
proximity to the nearest body of water similarly
made no difference in the probability of having
been awarded cost sharing. The authors also found
evidence that cost-share awards were not targeted
toward farmers whose behavior would change as a
result of the award. Farmers who were awarded
cost sharing used a smaller number of conservation
practices and achieved no greater coverage than
those who did not receive cost-share awards.
Conclusion
This paper uses a Ricardian land market equilibrium
model to examine the impacts of green payments on
the intensity of cultivation, on environmental dam-
age on-farm, and on ambient pollution. In contrast
to earlier studies, a model is used where output of
an intensive crop and on-farm environmental
degradation are joint products (rather than assuming
environmental damage is linked to a specific input).
Like those studies, this analysis shows that green
payments can lead to the extension of intensive
crop production, and thus may worsen ambient
pollution damage by subsidizing the expansion of
more intensive crop cultivation. It is also shown
that green payments based on actual costs incurred
can increase cultivation intensity and the degree of
on-farm environmental degradation (as a by-product
of making increased cultivation intensity more
profitable), as well as possibly extending intensive
crop production. As a result, green payment of this
kind may worsen ambient pollution damage on both
the intensive and extensive margins. Extensive mar-
gin distortions can be avoided by careful targeting,
although optimal targeting criteria may not seem
intuitively sensible from a physical or agronomic
perspective.
The analysis also indicates that in some cases
green payments will not lead to improvements in
ambient pollution because they are made to farmers
who would have found it profitable to adopt
resource-conserving technologies even without sub-
sidies. Targeting to avoid such outcomes is likely to
be quite difficult. Overall, the analysis suggests
optimal targeting of green payments can be quite
complex, given the potential for exacerbating envi-
ronmental quality problems and given the potential
for adverse selection.
The analysis presented here was conducted under
very specific assumptions about the relationship
between land quality, agricultural productivity,
on-farm environmental damage, ambient pollution,Lichtenberg Are Green Payments Good for the Environment?   147
and the effects of conservation measures. While the
case considered here is intuitively appealing for
many common environmental problems emanating
from agriculture, other cases are certainly possible.
Of particular interest is the case where on-farm
environmental damage contributes more to ambient
pollution on low-quality land. The socially optimal
land market equilibrium in such cases is likely not
to have the simple structure of the case analyzed
here. Instead, the social rent curves for each
technology may not be monotonic in land quality,
making it likely that there are multiple marginal
qualities of land at which it is socially optimal to
switch from one technology to another. The possi-
bility of such outcomes underscores the point made
in the preceding paragraph—that optimal targeting
of green payments is likely to be extremely
difficult.
The extent to which these adverse effects actu-
ally occur is, of course, an empirical question. But
since the current farm bill envisages a rapid
expansion of spending on green payments, it seems
important to study this question much more inten-
sively to provide a basis for determining how best
to proceed with implementing this expansion.
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